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Abstract
We investigate the political impact of entertainment television in
Italy over the past thirty years by exploiting the staggered intro-
duction of Silvio Berlusconi’s commercial TV network, Mediaset, in
the early 1980s. We find that individuals in municipalities that had
access to Mediaset prior to 1985 - when the network only featured
light entertainment programs - were significantly more likely to vote
for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for office. This
effect persists for almost two decades and five elections, and is es-
pecially pronounced for heavy TV viewers, namely the very young
and the old. We relate the extreme persistence of the effect to the
relative incidence of these age groups in the voting population, and
explore different mechanisms through which early exposure to en-
tertainment content may have influenced their political attitudes.
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1 Introduction
There is increasing evidence that exposure to biased news on TV can in-
fluence viewers’ voting decisions. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) document
that exposure to Fox News had a positive effect on vote share for the Repub-
lican party in the 2000 U.S. presidential elections. Similarly, Enikolopov et
al. (2011) find that access to NTV, an independent news channel in Rus-
sia, was associated with lower support for Vladimir Putin’s ruling party in
the 1999 parliamentary elections. However, news programs represent just
a fraction of total TV airtime,1 and other categories of content could ar-
guably also influence viewers’ attitudes. In fact, previous research has doc-
umented that, by priming particular cultural models, light entertainment
shows, soap operas, and advertising can have important and persistent
effects on various types of non-political behavior, from civic engagement
(Putnam, 2000; Olken, 2009) to gender attitudes (Jensen and Oster, 2009),
fertility choices (La Ferrara et al., 2012; Kearney and Levine, 2014), divorce
rates (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009), and consumption decisions (Bursztyn
and Cantoni, 2012). Yet, whether and how exposure to non-news content
affects viewers’ political decisions remains largely unexplored. Another lim-
itation of existing work on the influence of TV on voting is that it has only
looked at short-run effects - i.e. in one election - and little is known on how
long-lasting such impact may be.
This research attempts to fill both these gaps by investigating the im-
pact of entertainment TV on voting in Italy over the past thirty years. In
particular, we examine whether differential exposure to Berlusconi’s com-
mercial TV network, Mediaset, in the 1980s was associated with higher
electoral support for Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia in 1994, when he first
ran for office, and in the following five elections. Crucially, in the early
stages of Mediaset diffusion, when some areas had access to the network
and others did not, Mediaset channels were entirely devoted to light en-
tertainment programs, and newscasts were only introduced in 1991, when
access to the network was virtually ubiquitous.
Our empirical analysis exploits variation in early access to Mediaset
1According to the 2010 CRE Video Consumer Mapping Study, Americans devote
only 18.2% of their total watching time to news, compared to 46.8% to entertainment
programs and 21.8% to advertising.
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across Italian municipalities determined by the location of the network’s
transmitters that were active in 1985. These transmitters were inherited
from a multitude of local TV stations that were progressively incorporated
into the network in the early 1980s, more than a decade before Berlusconi
even considered entering politics; hence, it is unlikely that their location was
directly functional to Berlusconi’s later political ambitions. Nonetheless,
it is possible that Mediaset coverage in 1985 may be correlated with local
socio-economic characteristics that may affect electoral outcomes in ways
other than through TV.
We address this concern using two alternative approaches. First, we
regress the voting share of Forza Italia in each municipality on the lo-
cal intensity of Mediaset signal. We control for electoral district fixed
effects, local labor market fixed effects, the hypothetical signal intensity
in the absence of geomorphological obstacles, and various terrain charac-
teristics. In this context, the identification of the effect is based on the
residual variation in signal intensity - within very small geographical areas
- attributable to idiosyncratic geomorphological factors that are plausibly
uncorrelated with other determinants of voting. Our identification assump-
tion is corroborated by the fact that variation in 1985 signal intensity is
uncorrelated with population density and other socio-economic character-
istics, and, most importantly, with the electoral performance of any party
prior to 1994. Our second approach is based on the comparison between
neighboring municipalities. In particular, we look at differences in electoral
outcomes between pairs of neighbors with similar hypothetical signal inten-
sity but different actual exposure to Mediaset. Such strategy approximates,
in a very intuitive fashion, the ideal experiment of exposing to Mediaset
only one of two municipalities with comparable characteristics and similar
distance from the transmitters.
Both approaches deliver very similar results. In particular, we find that
in municipalities that were exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 the vote
share of Forza Italia in the 1994 elections was significantly higher than in
those that were not. This effect is sizeable - about 1 percentage point -
and very robust to different specifications and controls. Furthermore, the
effect persists until the 2008 elections, almost twenty-five years after the
differential exposure to Mediaset and fifteen years after Berlusconi entered
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politics.2
To study whether the effect of exposure to Mediaset varies across differ-
ent categories of viewers, we use individual survey data on TV consumption
and political behavior available for the same period.3 We find that the ef-
fect of early exposure to Mediaset increases with TV consumption, both
across geographical areas and socio-economic characteristics. In particu-
lar, the effect is larger for people living in Southern Italy, for females, for
the less educated, and for the unemployed. We also uncover an interesting
U-shaped relation with respect to age: both TV consumption and the ef-
fect of Mediaset on voting is much larger (about 10 percentage points) for
individuals that, at the time of the differential exposure, were either very
young (10 year-old or less) or old (55 year-old or more). This finding can
partly explain the extreme persistence of the effect over several elections.
Indeed, individuals that were very young in 1985 reached the voting age in
1994 or later and gradually replaced the oldest cohorts that were exiting
the electorate. Since the estimated effect of Mediaset exposure is very sim-
ilar for the two groups, this implies that, although the age composition of
Mediaset-affected voters changed over time, their overall electoral “power”
remained very stable.
Finally, we attempt to shed light on the possible channels through which
exposure to entertainment TV may have influenced viewers’ later voting
behavior. In this respect, we find that the influence of Mediaset on the two
most affected age groups, i.e. the very young and the old, operated through
very different mechanisms. On the one hand, individuals exposed to Me-
diaset as children became significantly less interested and participative in
politics as adults and hence, presumably, more vulnerable to Berlusconi’s
political rhetoric. On the other hand, old viewers exposed to Mediaset en-
tertainment content prior to 1985 were significantly more likely to watch
news on Mediaset after 1991, when the network launched its own newscasts
- newscasts which were characterised by a strong pro-Forza Italia bias (Du-
2For the sample of neighbouring municipalities the effect also persists in the 2013
elections.
3The data used are available from the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT)
and the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) conducted by the Istituto Cattaneo,
an independent research institution conducting research on electoral participation and
political trends in Italy since 1968.
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rante and Knight, 2012). Hence, our findings suggest that, while for young
viewers early exposure to entertainment content had a direct impact on po-
litical attitudes, for old viewers this effect was indirect, driven by increased
attachment to the network and later exposure to partisan news bias.
Our research contributes to the political economy literature on media
and voting in three ways. First, we document that exposure to entertain-
ment content can influence viewers’ political preferences and voting deci-
sions, and explore possible explanations for this relationship. In this respect
our findings are complementary to previous evidence on the electoral im-
pact of exposure to news content surveyed in DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2010) and Stromberg (2015).4 Second, spanning a period of almost three
decades, our study documents that even transitory shocks to media expo-
sure can have a long-lasting impact on political behavior, and relates such
persistence to the heterogeneity in media effects across age groups. These
results dovetail nicely with previous evidence on the long-lasting effect of
mass media on non-political attitudes discussed above, and suggest that
media-driven cultural changes may translate into different political prefer-
ences. Finally, by documenting considerable heterogeneity in the effect of
TV with respect to viewers’ age, gender, and socio-economic factors, our
findings underscore the possibility that particular segments of the popu-
lation, especially the very young, may be disproportionately affected by
television; a finding, the latter, that relates to previous evidence on the
impact of television on children’s attitudes and abilities (Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2008; Huang and Lee, 2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background information on the evolution of Italy’s political system
and broadcast television industry during the period of interest. Section 3
describes the data used in the empirical analysis and discusses the identifi-
cation strategy. Section 4 presents the main findings. Section 5 concludes.
4In this respect, our work is especially related to Barone et al. (2015) who study
the electoral impact of pro-Berlusconi bias on Mediaset news exploiting the staggered
introduction of digital TV, which diluted the audience share of Mediaset news programs.
They show that provinces in the Italian region of Piedmont that switched to digital TV
before the 2010 regional elections exhibit lower electoral support for the centre-right
coalition relative to provinces that switched only after the elections.
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2 Background
2.1 The rise of commercial TV in Italy
For more than twenty years after its foundation in 1954, the state-owned
TV corporation RAI, maintained an absolute monopoly on TV broadcast-
ing in Italy. Throughout this period private companies were not allowed to
broadcast on the grounds that the state would better protect and guarantee
the impartiality, objectivity, and completeness of television service (ruling
59/1960 by the Constitutional Court). In 1976 the ban was removed and
private companies were allowed to broadcast, though only at the local level.
To circumvent this restriction, a few business groups established broad-
cast syndication agreements among a multitude of small local stations.
Although formally independent, these stations would broadcast the same
content simultaneously across different local markets resembling, in prac-
tice, the functioning of a wider network. One such network, Canale 5, was
launched by Berlusconi in 1980; the other important ones were Prima Rete,
Italia 1, and Rete 4, controlled respectively by the Rizzoli, the Rusconi, and
the Mondadori groups.
In 1981, however, the Constitutional Court reiterated the ban on trans-
missions beyond the local level, inducing Prima Rete to leave the market,
and convincing Rusconi and Mondadori that antitrust legislation was on
its way. Only Berlusconi was prepared to stay the course, as he extended
his network and explicitly grouped the stations under the common logo of
Canale 5 (Ginsborg, 2005). In the absence of any intervention on the part
of the legislator, between 1982 and 1984 he also acquired Italia 1 and Rete
4 from his more cautious competitors. The three channels were then incor-
porated into Berlusconi’s holding Fininvest, which later became Mediaset.
The fate of Mediaset, however, remained vulnerable to judicial initia-
tives aimed at enforcing the restrictions on private broadcasting, which the
group had until then ignored. In October 1984, the attorneys of Turin
and Rome accused Mediaset of violating the dictate by the Constitutional
Court and demanded the disconnection of its transmitters. A few days
later, however, the government led by Bettino Craxi – leader of the Ital-
ian Socialist Party and Berlusconi’s long-term political sponsor – issued
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an emergency decree removing all geographic restrictions on broadcasting
beyond the local level.
The so-called “Berlusconi decree”, initially rejected by the Parliament
but forcefully reiterated and finally approved, would represent a landmark
in the evolution of the Italian television system. Until then the uncertain
legal prospects may have delayed the expansion of Mediaset. However, once
assured that its dominant position would not be threatened, the group mul-
tiplied its efforts to acquire new transmitters and expand its coverage to
the entire population. According to the data used in our empirical analy-
sis, at the beginning of 1985 Mediaset operated about 1,700 transmitters,
inherited from the former members of the broadcast syndication. More-
over, Mediaset never built its own antennas, finding it cheaper to use those
of the small local televisions that were progressively incorporated into the
network. Since the latter had been conceived to reach a local audience,
they lacked the power of RAI transmitters, and only about half of the
population could receive Mediaset channels with a good quality signal.
By 1987, however, the number of transmitters had doubled to 3,800,
and Mediaset was accessible to about 87% of the population (Constitu-
tional Court, 1988); by the end of 1990 that number had reached 98%,
comparable to RAI’s virtually universal coverage. At the same time, the
Parliament approved a new Telecommunication Law that largely confirmed
the regulatory framework of the 1985 decree and limited the possibility of
assigning new broadcasting licenses to other actors.
Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Italian TV market consisted
of a RAI-Mediaset duopoly. Interestingly, public and private channels dif-
fered markedly in terms of content. Indeed, many entertainment programs
launched by Mediaset in the early 1980s represented an absolute novelty in
the Italian television landscape that would profoundly influence Italians’
lifestyle models over the years that followed (Porro and Russo, 2000; Gins-
borg, 2005). As shown in Figure 1, the majority of airtime was devoted to
foreign TV series, particularly action dramas and soap operas, and the rest
consisted of light entertainment shows. News programs were not broadcast
until 1991, and other types of informational or educational programs, such
as talk shows, investigative reports, and documentaries were also rarely
found on Mediaset. More generally, Berlusconi’s television-making style
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Figure 1: Share of airtime devoted to different types of programs on Me-
diaset and RAI 1987-1997
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Note: the source of these data is the series “Statistiche Culturali”, published by ISTAT.
stood in stark contrast to the pedagogical nature of public TV, which de-
voted a large share of airtime to newscasts, documentaries, and family films.
This revolutionary approach proved very successful: according to Nielsen
data cited by the Constitutional Court (1988), in 1987 Mediaset reached
an audience share comparable to that of RAI, and it was the uncontested
leader in the advertising market.
2.2 The Italian political system and Berlusconi’s en-
try into politics
According to several of his long-time associates and by his own account,
Silvio Berlusconi had no intention of becoming personally involved in poli-
tics until the abrupt decline of his long-time political patron, Bettino Craxi,
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between 1992 and 1993.5 At that time, a series of corruption scandals (Tan-
gentopoli, Italian for “Bribeville”) marked the transition from the First to
the Second Republic. In the wake of the emergency, a temporary tech-
nocratic government was instituted and early elections were called for in
March 1994.
The prospects looked pretty dire for Mediaset at the time, as the group
faced serious financial difficulties, had lost its political sponsors, and feared
the electoral success of the Democratic Party – the heir of Italy’s Com-
munist Party – which had remained largely untouched by the scandals.
Indeed, the left-wing party had been traditionally critical of Mediaset’s
dominant position, and advocated a general reform of the media industry.
After careful consideration Berlusconi decided to take action and in De-
cember 1993, three months before the elections, he announced the creation
of a new political party, Forza Italia (“Forward Italy”), which aspired to
occupy the space left by the collapse of the traditional center-right parties.6
Forza Italia was defined by Seisselberg (1996) as a “media-mediated
personality-party”. This was apparent in many aspects of the new party’s
organization and campaigning: the announcement of Berlusconi’s decision
to “enter the field” (one of the frequent football metaphors in Berlusconi’s
speeches) was filmed at his home and aired simultaneously on all three Me-
diaset channels; the party coordinators and many of the top candidates were
selected from the ranks of Mediaset and from among the popular figures
populating Mediaset prime-time shows; finally the selection and training
of candidates was entirely entrusted to Publitalia, Mediaset’s advertising
division (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). This innovative and aggressive com-
munication strategy proved very successful. In the 1994 elections, Forza
Italia received a relative majority of the votes, and the center-right coali-
tion with the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (“National Alliance”) and
the separatist Lega Nord (“Northern League”) gained a solid majority in
both branches of Parliament. On May 10, 1994, Berlusconi was sworn in
as Italy’s Prime Minister for the first time.
5See, for instance, the testimony of Ezio Cartotto, a then close collaborator of Berlus-
coni, as reported in Veltri and Travaglio (2009).
6In 2007 Forza Italia changed its name into Popolo Delle Liberta` (“People of Free-
dom”) after merging with its traditional right-wing ally, Alleanza Nazionale. For sim-
plicity, here we always refer to it as Forza Italia.
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The first Berlusconi government was short-lived, as the Lega Nord quickly
withdrew from the coalition, leading to new elections in 1996. Nevertheless,
the emergence and swift success of Berlusconi’s party in 1994 produced a
dramatic transformation of Italy’s political landscape, the consequences of
which persist today. Twenty-five years later, Berlusconi remains the leader
of the center-right coalition and his distinctive political style – character-
ized by an aggressive rhetoric and a pervasive use of the media – has been
emulated even by his political adversaries (though with much less success).
Out of the six national elections held over this period, the center-right pre-
vailed in 1994, 2001, and 2008, and lost by a very small margin in 1996,
2006, and 2013.7
According to many commentators, Berlusconi’s control of commercial
TV has been decisive both for his early electoral success and for his ex-
traordinary political longevity. However, there is little evidence of whether
exposure to Mediaset actually affected voting for Berlusconi’s party, how
persistent this effect might have been, and the channels through which it
may have operated. In what follows we attempt to shed light on these
questions.
3 Data and empirical strategy
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the main events described above, as
well as our empirical strategy for estimating the effect of early exposure to
Mediaset on subsequent electoral outcomes. Specifically, we relate variation
in the availability of Mediaset prior to 1985, when differences in coverage
across geographical areas were still considerable, to electoral support for
Forza Italia in 1994 and in the elections that followed.
We thus obtained, from the Italian Ministry of Interior, municipality-
level data on electoral outcomes in all national elections held between 1976
and 2013. We focus on voting for the Lower House (Camera) because
the different electoral system in the Upper House (Senato) encouraged the
formation of joint lists, often changing across different areas of the country.8
7Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the vote share obtained by the main political
coalitions in the Second Republic.
8For instance, in the 1994 elections Forza Italia ran together with the Lega Nord in
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Figure 2: Timeline of events, 1980-1994
1980 1985 1991 1987 1992 1994 1990 
In Table 1 we report summary statistics for the vote share of Forza Italia.
As to the main explanatory variable, we need information on access to
Mediaset in the early stages of the network’s diffusion, when geographic
differences in coverage were still wide. Unfortunately, data on the distribu-
tion of Mediaset viewers in the early 1980s are not available. Futhermore,
actual viewership rates would measure an equilibrium outcome – possi-
bly correlated with a range of socio-economic confounds – rather than an
exogenous source of variation. Instead, we construct a measure of Medi-
aset availability, across narrow geographical areas, based on the location
and technical characteristics of its transmitters in 1985. This approach
allows us to consistently estimate the effect of Mediaset on later electoral
outcomes, provided that availability prior to 1985 is exogenous to voting
behavior over the period 1994-2013.
Some of the facts discussed in the previous section suggest that this
is actually the case. First of all, the transmitting infrastructure was in-
herited from the local networks that were progressively incorporated into
the broadcast syndication. Therefore, the location and power of the trans-
mitters were never chosen by Mediaset, which always avoided (mainly for
economic reasons) getting involved in the construction of new antennas.
In principle, it is still possible - although not very likely - that the syndi-
cate targeted local televisions in politically strategic areas (e.g., marginal
electoral districts, or districts with a large share of swing voters). How-
ever, the entirely changed political conditions between the early 1980s and
northern regions and with Alleanza Nazionale in the south, so it is difficult to isolate
the electoral support for each member of the coalition.
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1994 (specifically, different electoral rules and different parties) would have
frustrated any such strategy. Most importantly, Berlusconi’s decision to
pursue a political career matured a few months before the 1994 elections,
in the wake of political upheavals that were unforeseeable back in the early
1980s (see Section 2.2).
For all these reasons, we can reasonably exclude the possibility that the
geographical expansion of Mediaset before 1985 was intentionally driven
by the later political ambitions of Berlusconi. Nevertheless, our empirical
analysis will exploit only variation in Mediaset availability from idiosyn-
cratic geomorphological factors, so as to exclude the effect of other factors
possibly correlated with the location and power of transmitters (e.g., prox-
imity to large cities). We next discuss in detail the data on signal intensity
and the identification strategy, and we provide some indirect tests of our
main identification assumptions.
3.1 Data on signal intensity
A broadcast television signal is transmitted over the air according to the
laws of physics for electromagnetic propagation. In the free space, signal
strength would decrease with the square of the distance from the transmit-
ter, however in reality patterns of decay are much more complex due to
diffraction caused by mountains and other obstacles.
We compute the intensity of the Mediaset signal in early 1985 using
a professional engineer-developed software program that simulates signal
propagation, based on the Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model (ITM)
algorithm. The ITM was originally developed by the US government for
frequency-planning purposes and allows one to accurately predict signal
strength across narrow geographical cells (Phillips et al., 2011). The version
used in this paper is described in Hufford (2002), and has been previously
used by Olken (2009), Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), Enikolopov et al. (2011),
and DellaVigna et al. (2012).
To implement the ITM algorithm we combine information on trans-
mitters’ locations and power with a high-resolution geo-orographic map of
Italy. Detailed data on the location and technical characteristics of the
1,700 Mediaset transmitters operating in 1985 were obtained directly from
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
unweighted observations weighted by population in 1981
obs. mean st.dev. median obs. mean st.dev. median
Signal 8086 -0.398 1.017 -0.234 8062 0.008 0.831 0.013
SignalFree 8086 -0.063 1.001 -0.246 8062 0.358 1.155 0.208
Signal ≥ 0 8095 0.313 0.464 0.000 8062 0.516 0.500 1.000
Population (ths.) 1981 8062 7.010 45.449 2.296 8062 301.6 683.7 24.4
Area (100s sq. Km) 8093 0.372 0.499 0.218 8062 1.557 2.829 0.627
Electorate (ths.) 1994 8014 6.034 36.042 2.070 7988 239.0 548.5 21.8
Voting turnout 1994 8014 84.2 10.5 87.6 7988 85.9 7.8 88.1
Forza Italia 1994 8014 18.9 7.8 19.4 7988 19.5 8.2 19.7
Forza Italia 1996 8014 17.9 6.3 17.3 7987 19.2 6.4 18.2
Forza Italia 2001 8014 26.5 7.9 26.7 7985 27.1 6.7 27.1
Forza Italia 2006 8016 22.9 7.2 23.0 7986 22.9 6.1 22.4
Forza Italia 2008 8089 33.7 10.1 33.5 8059 35.9 8.9 35.7
Forza Italia 2013 8016 20.8 6.8 20.4 7988 20.8 6.1 20.0
Sub-sample: Signal ≥ 0
Forza Italia 1994 2523 20.8 7.1 21.2 2512 21.1 7.4 20.9
Forza Italia 1996 2523 18.9 6.1 18.1 2512 20.1 6.7 18.9
Forza Italia 2001 2523 28.6 7.1 28.9 2510 28.3 6.4 28.3
Forza Italia 2006 2523 23.9 6.5 24.0 2510 23.5 5.8 22.7
Forza Italia 2008 2527 35.5 9.2 34.6 2514 37.1 8.5 37.5
Forza Italia 2013 2523 22.0 6.3 21.2 2512 21.2 5.9 20.0
Sub-sample: Signal < 0
Forza Italia 1994 5491 18.1 8.0 18.6 5476 17.7 8.5 18.6
Forza Italia 1996 5491 17.4 6.3 16.9 5475 18.3 5.8 17.3
Forza Italia 2001 5491 25.6 8.0 25.6 5475 25.8 6.9 25.3
Forza Italia 2006 5493 22.5 7.4 22.4 5476 22.3 6.4 21.8
Forza Italia 2008 5562 32.9 10.4 33.0 5545 34.6 9.2 33.7
Forza Italia 2013 5493 20.3 7.0 19.9 5476 20.4 6.3 19.7
the Mediaset group. For each transmitter we obtained a technical report
indicating the latitude, longitude, altitude, and height of the transmitter’s
location, as well as its transmitting power and frequency.9
Using the ITM algorithm we compute Mediaset signal intensity in deci-
bels (dB) at the centroid of all 8,100 Italian municipalities (comune). Mu-
nicipalities represent the lowest administrative units in Italy and are fairly
small both in terms of surface (mean of 37.2 km2, median of 21.8 km2)
and population (mean and median equal to 7,010 and 2,296 people, respec-
tively), see Table 1.
The left map in Figure 3 reports the distribution of Mediaset signal
across Italian municipalities in 1985. Reception of Mediaset channels is op-
9A sample technical report sheet is reported in the Web Appendix (Figure A3)
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Figure 3: Geographic distribution of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985
Note: The maps represent the geographic distribution of the simulated intensity of Mediaset’s signal in
1985, respectively, under real conditions (left) and in the absence of geomorphological obstacles (right).
timal when signal intensity is positive, while it is imperfect or nil for values
below zero. However, in the absence of data on the number of Mediaset
viewers in 1985, the precise relationship between signal and reception can
only be inferred from previous studies.
Using survey data on viewership of 11 TV channels in Indonesia, Olken
(2009) finds that for values of signal intensity below -50 the share of indi-
viduals able to watch a given channel is close to zero. Viewership increases
as the signal gets stronger, reaching 100% when the signal becomes pos-
itive. By contrast, Bursztyn and Cantoni (2012) find that reception in
East Germany increased from about 0% to 80% when the signal changed
from -86.3 dB to -75.9 dB, suggesting fairly good reception also at lower
intensities. Finally, Enikolopov et al. (2011) estimate that a unit increase
in signal strength of the independent Russian network NTV is associated
with an average increase in the share of viewers of 0.3 percentage points
– they do not distinguish between areas with positive and negative signal
intensity.
Taken together, this evidence confirms that in areas with positive signal
intensity the whole populations is exposed, while reception is poorer (and
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possibly nil) in areas with negative signal. Although the relationship be-
tween signal and viewership is not stable across countries and/or periods, it
is reasonable to expect that most of the variation in exposure should occur
at intermediate values of signal intensity, whereas even large differences in
signal strength at both extremes of the distribution should have little or no
effect on the quality of reception. For this reason we exclude municipalities
in the top and bottom 2.5% of the signal distribution.10
We compute our main explanatory variable, Signal, by dividing the
original signal intensity by its standard deviation. Table 1 reports the
mean and median of Signal across municipalities. The variable is positive
(meaning good Mediaset reception) in about one-third of municipalities,
which account for more than half of the population. This is not surprising,
given that local televisions aimed at reaching larger cities.
Table 1 also reports the average and median vote share of Forza Italia
across Italian municipalities in all national elections since 1994, distin-
guishing between municipalities with perfect and less-than-perfect (or nil)
reception of Mediaset before 1985 (Signal ≥ 0 and Signal < 0, respec-
tively). The vote share is consistently higher, by 1 to 2 percentage points
on average, in the former municipalities. However, such differences may
reflect heterogeneity along other dimensions, for instance the larger size of
cities exposed to Mediaset.
Next, we discuss how to isolate the causal effect of Mediaset on voting
from variation in these other omitted factors.
3.2 Empirical strategy
Our identification strategy exploits variation in signal intensity across oth-
erwise similar municipalities. This approach is the same used by Yanagizawa-
Drott (2014), but it differs from the one used by Olken (2009) and Enikolopov
et al. (2011), who also have information on the number of viewers and
use signal intensity as an instrument for viewership rates in a two-stage-
least-squares framework. In the absence of information on viewership, we
10The distribution of signal intensity and the upper and lower trimming are shown in
the Web Appendix (Figure A2). The results are qualitatively unchanged when including
all observations.
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estimate the reduced form coefficient of exposure to Mediaset.11
To account for the potentially endogenous location of the transmitters,
we simulate the hypothetical signal intensity in the absence of any geomor-
phological obstacles (i.e., assuming terrain is flat). This hypothetical signal
intensity is shown on the right map of Figure 3. The difference between ac-
tual and hypothetical signal intensity within relatively small areas is driven
by idiosyncratic terrain characteristics: this is exactly the type of variation
that we exploit in our empirical analysis. In practice, we implement this
idea using both linear regression and matching methods.
3.2.1 OLS regression
Following Olken (2009) we regress our outcomes of interest on signal in-
tensity (Signal) controlling for signal intensity under the flat terrain hy-
pothesis (SignalFree). The underlying idea is that, keeping SignalFree
constant, the coefficient of Signal is identified by residual variation due
to idiosyncratic differences in topography, rather than by the (potentially
endogenous) location and power of the transmitters.12 Of course, terrain
characteristics could potentially affect the socio-economic environment in
other ways (for example, terrain ruggedness could affect the density of pop-
ulation and/or economic activity). To address this concern, in our main
specification we control for a range of additional geographic variables, in-
cluding the municipality’s area and its square, average altitude and its
square, and average terrain ruggedness.
We also include two sets of fixed effects: electoral districts (EDs) and
local labor markets (LLMs). The 475 EDs include multiple adjacent mu-
nicipalities within a given province. The 686 LLMs are instead defined
by ISTAT on the basis of workers’ commuting patterns, and unlike the
EDs can include adjacent municipalities belonging to different provinces
or regions.13 The following estimating equation summarizes our empirical
11Bursztyn and Cantoni (2012) employ yet another approach, assigning German mu-
nicipalities into treatment and control groups when signal intensity is above or below
the one available in a particular location (Dresden), which corresponds, presumably, to
a large increase in the quality of reception.
12Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) adopts a very similar approach, namely regressing the
outcome of interest on actual signal intensity and controlling for a polynomial in distance
from the transmitters as well as for terrain characteristics.
13As an example, the Appendix Figure A4 shows the partition of the mid-sized region
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strategy:
FIm = βSignalm + γSignalFreem + δ
′Tm +EDi(m) + LLMj(m) + εm (1)
where FIm is the percentage of votes obtained by Forza Italia in munic-
ipality m; Signalm and SignalFreem are, respectively, Mediaset’s actual
signal intensity in 1985 and the hypothetical signal intensity assuming flat
terrain; Tm is a vector of municipal characteristics including area and its
square, altitude and its square, and an index for average terrain rugged-
ness; EDi(m) and LLMj(m) are the fixed effects for, respectively, the i-th
district and the j-th labor market in which the municipality is located; and
εm is an error term. To make the estimates representative at the national
level even in the presence of heterogeneous effects across municipalities, we
weigh observations by municipality population in 1981; standard errors are
clustered by electoral district.14
3.2.2 Matching neighboring municipalities
As an alternative empirical strategy, we exploit the change in the quality
of reception around Signal = 0 (Olken, 2009). In particular, we com-
pare electoral results between any two neighboring municipalities, i and
j, such that Signali > 0 and Signalj ≤ 0. Overall, we identify 3,021
such neighbor-pairs. Comparing electoral results within this sub-sample
approximates the ideal experiment of exposing to Mediaset only one of two
municipalities characterized by similar conditions and similar distance from
the transmitters. To make the comparison even more convincing, we fur-
ther restrict the sample to pairs of neighbor municipalities with a difference
in SignalFree lower than 1 or 0.5 dB, and we control in addition for terrain
characteristics (area, altitude, and ruggedness) and for neighbor-pair fixed
effects, thus keeping constant all common characteristics between any two
adjacent municipalities.15
In the end, both the OLS and matching estimates exploit variation in
exposure to Mediaset across very small municipalities, for which the (en-
of Abruzzo into electoral districts and local labor markets.
14As discussed in Section 4.2, the results are generally stronger when estimating the
effect on the unweighted observations.
15See Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a similar approach.
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dogenous) location of transmitters should be a lesser concern. In the OLS
regression (1), the targeting of large cities (e.g., Milan or Rome) by Medi-
aset transmitters is indeed absorbed by the control variable SignalFree,
so the coefficient Signal would be identified out of residual variation in
Signal across smaller municipalities. As to the matching procedure, the
median and average population in the sub-sample of neighbor municipali-
ties differentially exposed (but similar in terms of SignalFree) equal 2,164
and 5,857, respectively.
We next provide empirical support for our main identification assump-
tion.
3.3 Exogeneity
The empirical identification of β in equation (1) exploits variation in actual
signal intensity (Signal) across municipalities that face the same political
and economic conditions - as captured, respectively, by the set of ED and
LLM fixed effects - and controlling for residual differences within EDs and
LLMs in the hypothetical signal intensity absent geomorphological obsta-
cles (SignalFree), ruggedness, and other terrain characteristics generating
such obstacles. This is a very demanding specification, as EDs and LLMs
are narrow geographical areas, much smaller than provinces (the admin-
istrative unit just above municipalities in the EU-NUTS classification).16
Although the fundamental identification assumption that residual variation
in Signal is independent of εm is essentially untestable, in Tables 2 and 3
we provide an indirect test of conditional independence by looking at the
correlation of Signal with, respectively, political preferences in the 1970s
and 1980s (i.e., the lagged values of the main outcome variable) as well
as with other municipal characteristics that could potentially affect voting
behavior.
Table 2 shows the correlation between Signal and the voting share of
the main parties and coalitions at the national elections in 1976, 1979,
1983, 1987, and 1992. The first two elections represent a genuine pre-
treatment period, as Mediaset transmissions started only in 1980. The
16The median area across EDs and LLMs is 527 and 352 square kilometers, respec-
tively, in contrast to 2,246 for provinces.
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Table 2: Correlation of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 with electoral
results during the period 1976-1992
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: OLS OLS with controls
obs. mean Signal R2 Signal R2
Italian Communist Party, 1976 7,561 33.337 1.740 0.005 -0.520 0.806
(0.137) (1.160) (0.579)
Pentapartito, 1976 7,561 54.948 -0.442 0.005 0.240 0.806
(0.132) (1.069) (0.512)
Other parties, 1976 7,375 9.200 -1.042 0.003 0.256 0.935
(0.093) (1.046) (0.247)
Italian Communist Party, 1979 7,577 28.973 1.607 0.002 -0.657 0.830
(0.138) (1.168) (0.539)
Pentapartito, 1979 7,573 55.146 -0.719 0.001 0.393 0.813
(0.128) (1.107) (0.480)
Other parties, 1979 7,577 11.672 -0.499 0.009 0.230 0.913
(0.081) (1.013) (0.236)
Italian Communist Party, 1983 7,650 27.996 1.490 0.002 -0.680 0.829
(0.138) (1.214) (0.558)
Pentapartito, 1983 7,584 53.597 -0.825 0.005 0.399 0.809
(0.127) (1.169) (0.489)
Other parties, 1983 7,584 12.523 -0.293 0.020 0.291 0.902
(0.082) (0.991) (0.277)
Italian Communist Party, 1987 7,584 25.233 0.810 0.002 -0.724 0.838
(0.133) (1.144) (0.512)
Pentapartito, 1987 7,584 54.714 -1.130 0.001 0.436 0.829
(0.128) (1.227) (0.459)
Other parties, 1987 7,584 15.062 0.668 0.007 0.253 0.913
(0.088) (1.006) (0.265)
Italian Communist Party, 1992 7,583 15.179 0.387 0.000 -0.074 0.862
(0.105) (0.862) (0.369)
Pentapartito, 1992 7,583 50.561 -2.995* 0.007 -0.202 0.891
(0.145) (1.568) (0.413)
Other parties, 1992 7,579 28.791 2.989** 0.007 0.279 0.942
(0.136) (1.461) (0.255)
Note: The table reports the number of observations, mean, and correlation with the intensity
of Mediaset signal in 1985 of the voting share of the main political parties and coalitions be-
tween 1976 and 1992. Specifically, column (1) reports the coefficient and R2 of the univariate
OLS regression of each variable on the intensity of Mediaset signal in 1985 (Signal) controlling
for the simulated intensity in the absence of geomorphological obstacles (SignalFree), while
column (2) adds local fixed effects and terrain characteristics. Regressions are weighted by
municipality population in 1981, with the exception of those for total population, population
density, and population growth. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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following three elections occurred after the introduction of Mediaset but
before the advent of Forza Italia. As such the results for this period allow
us to assess any correlation between exposure to Mediaset and preferences
for parties other than Forza Italia. Specifically, we focus on the electoral
results of the Italian Communist Party, the only party to survive (although
with different names) the passage from the First to the Second Republic;
the center-right coalition Pentapartito, formed by the Christian Democrats
and four smaller parties; and a residual group comprising other (minor)
parties.17
The univariate regression of electoral outcomes on Signal, reported in
column (1) of the table, is generally not significantly different from zero.
This is particularly true for the pre-treatment period (1976 and 1979) as
well as for the first elections held after the introduction of Mediaset (1983
and 1987).18 The coefficients for the Pentapartito and for the other parties
turn significant in the last election of the First Republic (1992). If anything,
exposure to Mediaset seems associated with lower political support for the
center-right coalition to the advantage of other smaller parties, however
such correlation also disappears when controlling for the other regressors
in equation (1), see column (2) of Table 2. In general, the point estimates
in multivariate regressions are always very small in terms of magnitude
(relative to the mean value of the dependent variable, also reported in the
table) and they are never statistically significant.
Overall, there is neither evidence that the location of Mediaset trans-
mitters aligned with pre-existing political preferences across municipalities,
nor that differential exposure to Mediaset after 1980 had a significant im-
pact on voting for any party before Forza Italia. The same results hold
when we compare neighbor municipalities applying the matching proce-
dure described above, particularly when we restrict to those with minor
17The four other members of the Pentapartito were the Italian Socialist Party - an
historical leftist party turning to the center-right of the political spectrum in 1976 - the
Liberal Party, the Republican Party, and the Social-Democratic Party.
18For space reasons, the balance test in Table 2 considers only the total voting share
obtained by the Pentapartito and by all “other parties” (outside the Italian Communist
Party and the Pentapartito) but the results are similar when distinguishing between all
parties inside these aggregates. A graph with the distribution of coefficients obtained
for all parties is presented later in the paper (Section 4.1).
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Table 3: Correlation of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 with municipality
characteristics
(1) (2)
Variable: OLS OLS with controls
obs. mean Signal R2 Signal R2
Population, thousands (1981) 7,574 6.940 69.254 0.252 9.184 0.999
(0.511) (63.580) (7.535)
Population per sq. Km (1981) 7,574 256.764 733.816** 0.114 49.098 0.927
(6.957) (325.460) (61.765)
Population growth, 1981-2001 7,574 0.033 0.027 0.012 0.002 0.621
(0.003) (0.018) (0.010)
Activity rate, percentage (1991) 7,574 42.260 2.544*** 0.047 0.136 0.858
(0.046) (0.279) (0.152)
Employment rate, percentage (1991) 7,574 35.084 3.162*** 0.021 0.137 0.953
(0.087) (0.566) (0.162)
Unemployment rate, percentage (1991) 7,574 6.933 -0.855** 0.005 -0.106 0.791
(0.047) (0.358) (0.174)
log income per capita, euros (1985) 7,503 1.739 0.109*** 0.039 0.025*** 0.913
(0.003) (0.035) (0.008)
Education, % higher education (1981) 7,574 13.187 1.409** 0.146 0.730*** 0.833
(0.068) (0.693) (0.236)
Firms per capita (1981) 7,574 0.051 0.001 0.043 -0.000 0.724
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Voluntarily association X 100 pop. (1981) 7,574 0.103 -0.001 0.033 0.003 0.497
(0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
Voluntarily association X 100 firms (1981) 7,574 2.091 -0.112 0.014 -0.004 0.434
(0.020) (0.134) (0.102)
Note: The table reports the number of observations, mean, and correlation with the intensity of Medi-
aset signal in 1985 of municipality characteristics. Specifically, column (1) reports the coefficient and
R2 of the univariate OLS regression of each variable on the intensity of Mediaset signal in 1985 (Signal)
controlling for the simulated intensity in the absence of geomorphological obstacles (SignalFree), while
column (2) adds local fixed effects and terrain characteristics. Regressions are weighted by municipality
population in 1981, with the exception of those for total population, population density, and population
growth. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
differences in SignalFree.19
In Table 3 we explore the correlation between Signal and other mu-
nicipality characteristics: total population, population density, population
growth, labor market conditions, education, number of firms per capita,
and social capital (as measured by the number of voluntarily associations).
With the notable exception of social capital, the other factors are signif-
icantly correlated with Signal in the univariate regressions (column 1).
As should be expected, the expansion of Mediaset throughout the Italian
territory was not random, instead targeting more densely populated and
economically developed areas. However, most of the correlation with these
local characteristics is absorbed by the other variables on the right-hand
19These results are available in Tables A1 and A2 of the Web Appendix.
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side of equation (1) (column 2). Comparing the R2 coefficients in columns
1 and 2, the joint variation in SignalFree, topography, and fixed effects
explains between 60% and 90% of the overall variation for most socio-
economic characteristics. Once these additional covariates are included in
the regression, Signal is no longer correlated with population (levels, den-
sity, and growth), labor market conditions, and the number of firms per
capita. Signal continues to be correlated, instead, with educational at-
tainment and income per capita; in light of this, we will include the latter
variables as additional controls in our specification.
In sum, although there are (unconditional) differences between munici-
palities that were exposed to Mediaset earlier and later, in all but two cases
the (conditional) difference controlling for the other covariates in equation
(1) is not significantly different from zero. Most importantly, there are no
differences (either conditionally or unconditionally) in voting towards any
party or coalition before Forza Italia. This last finding provides a partic-
ularly compelling argument in favor of the assumption that, although the
expansion of Mediaset was not random, it was not systematically correlated
with pre-existing political preferences.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline estimates
Table 4 shows the effect of Signal on voting for Forza Italia in 1994 - the
first election in which Berlusconi ran for office. The univariate regression in
column (1) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms
of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in Signal is associated
with a 3-percentage-point increase in the vote share of Forza Italia. This
is quite a large effect, corresponding to 40 percent of a standard deviation
of the dependent variable.
In column (2) we control for signal intensity under the flat terrain hy-
pothesis (SignalFree) and in column (3) we add the geomorphological con-
trols. The fact that the coefficient of Signal remains unaffected suggests
that endogeneity in the location and power of Mediaset transmitters is not
driving the result. Consistent with this, the univariate regression of Forza
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Table 4: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for Forza Italia in 1994 (OLS
estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signal 2.842*** 3.205*** 3.651*** 0.897*** 0.851***
(0.866) (0.706) (0.762) (0.234) (0.235)
SignalFree -0.289 0.026 -0.664** -0.640**
(0.723) (0.475) (0.262) (0.255)
Area (100s sq. Km) -0.973 0.853** 0.873**
(0.695) (0.380) (0.404)
Area2 0.030 -0.079 -0.069
(0.054) (0.093) (0.093)
Altitude (ths.) -6.268 -12.732*** -10.975***
(4.494) (1.580) (1.626)
Altitude2 -0.074 7.136*** 6.374***
(3.961) (1.271) (1.291)
Ruggedness 0.007* -0.002*** -0.002**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Electorate (ths.) -0.004
(0.004)
Log income per capita (ths. Euros) 5.115***
(0.764)
Education (% high-school) -0.088***
(0.030)
Constant 19.729*** 19.808*** 21.302*** 23.532*** 14.998***
(0.568) (0.578) (0.751) (2.589) (2.906)
Observations 7,583 7,583 7,573 7,573 7,502
Electoral district FE NO NO NO YES YES
Local labor market FE NO NO NO YES YES
R2 0.050 0.051 0.108 0.918 0.921
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of
Forza Italia at the 1994 national elections. Signal and SignalFree are the simulated intensity of Medi-
aset’s signal in 1985 under real conditions and in the absence of geomorphological obstacles, respectively.
Area, Altitude, Area2, and Altitude2 are the municipality’s surface and average altitude and the respec-
tive squared terms; Ruggedness is the municipality’s average terrain ruggedness index; Electorate is
the number of eligible voters in the concerned elections; Log income per capita is the logarithm of per
capita income in 1985; Education is the share of the population with at least a high-school diploma;
specifications in columns (4) and (5) include in addition electoral district and local labor market fixed
effects. Observations are weighted by municipality population in 1981. Standard errors clustered at the
electoral district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Italia’s vote share on SignalFree is not significantly different from zero
(coefficient -0.568, standard error 0.483). In column (4) we add electoral
district and local labor market fixed effects. The point estimate on Sig-
nal decreases to slightly less than 1 percentage point and remains virtually
unaffected in column (5), when we also control for the number of eligible
voters, log-income per capita, and education (i.e. the variables that were
statistically significant in the balance test of Table 3).
Our estimate of the effect of Mediaset could still be biased if signal
intensity was correlated with some unobservable municipal characteristics
that affect voting patterns in ways other than through TV. Although the
existence of such correlation is untestable, a test a` la Altonji et al. (2005)
can be informative of how large omitted variable bias would need to be in
order to explain the estimated coefficient of interest. We perform such a
test using the formal procedure developed by Oster (2013). Applying this
approach to our full specification (column 5 of Table 4) we find that, for
the estimated effect to be zero, the degree of selection on unobservables
would need to be about eight times larger than that on observables. Under
the assumption of equal selection, the biased-adjusted coefficient would be
quantitatively similar to the original one (0.752 compared to 0.850).
Overall, our findings suggest that that exposure to Mediaset before 1985
brought an electoral advantage to Berlusconi when he ran for election one
decade later. Interestingly, this effect appears to be very persistent over
time. In Table 5, we estimate the same specification for all the following
elections: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2013. In all but the last
election, the estimated coefficient of Signal remains very stable, between
0.7 and 1 percentage point.
These results are strengthened when we restrict to neighbor municipal-
ities that were differentially exposed to Mediaset, following the procedure
described in Section 3.2; see Table 6. In particular, when we restrict to
neighbor-pairs with a difference in SignalFree lower than 1 or 0.5 dB, the
effect of exposure to Mediaset is somewhat larger than in OLS regressions
and it persists also in 2013 (last two columns of the table). Overall, results
are very similar between the two methods, so we stick to OLS regressions
on the full sample throughout the rest of the paper.
Finally, in Figure 4 we compare the effect of Signal on voting for Forza
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Table 5: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for Forza Italia 1994-2013
(OLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 1994-2013
Signal 0.850*** 0.705*** 0.842*** 0.948*** 0.991*** 0.188 0.666***
(0.235) (0.204) (0.301) (0.285) (0.337) (0.279) (0.231)
Constant 15.216*** 10.875*** 24.051*** 15.274*** 30.456*** 12.010*** 12.836***
(2.915) (2.633) (3.289) (3.281) (3.746) (3.901) (2.996)
Observations 7,503 7,502 7,500 7,501 7,565 7,503 45,074
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
R2 0.921 0.873 0.815 0.790 0.862 0.802 0.716
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share of
Forza Italia in each election between 1994 and 2013 (columns 1-6) as well as the average effect when
pooling all elections (column 7). Signal is the simulated intensity of Mediaset’s signal in 1985. All
regressions control for SignalFree, Area, Altitude, Area2, Altitude2, Ruggedness, Electorate, Log income
per capita, Education, electoral district and local labor market fixed effects; the specification in column
(7) includes in addition year fixed effects . Observations are weighted by municipality population in
1981. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 6: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for Forza Italia 1994-2013
(neighboring municipalities)
Means comparison FEs and topography
Election: All |SF | < 1 |SF | < 0.5 All |SF | < 1 |SF | < 0.5
1994 0.645* 0.808* 0.949* 0.554*** 0.821*** 0.905***
(0.346) (0.417) (0.520) (0.139) (0.216) (0.294)
1996 0.701** 0.869** 0.796 0.608*** 0.802*** 0.703**
(0.288) (0.381) (0.494) (0.150) (0.220) (0.281)
2001 0.698** 1.052** 1.286** 0.648*** 1.015*** 1.104***
(0.340) (0.452) (0.574) (0.180) (0.285) (0.376)
2006 0.605* 0.798* 1.097** 0.560*** 0.803*** 0.965***
(0.327) (0.442) (0.541) (0.177) (0.275) (0.354)
2008 0.424 0.759 1.099 0.375* 0.801** 0.954**
(0.445) (0.691) (0.820) (0.216) (0.331) (0.430)
2013 0.263 0.837 0.765 0.270 0.902*** 0.831**
(0.311) (0.518) (0.615) (0.176) (0.289) (0.364)
1994-2013 0.556** 0.854** 0.998** 0.511*** 0.859*** 0.912***
(0.279) (0.377) (0.464) (0.104) (0.157) (0.205)
Note: The table illustrates the difference in vote share for Forza Italia, in each election between 1994
and 2013, between neighboring municipalities with Signal above and below zero (i.e., that could and
could not receive Mediaset channels in 1985). The first column reports the coefficients of a regression
of the vote share of Forza Italia on a dummy for Signal greater than zero across the total sample of
neighbor-pairs. The second and third columns report analogous coefficients estimated on the sub-sample
of neighbor-pairs with difference in SignalFree smaller than 1 dB and 0.5 dB, respectively. The last three
columns report the estimated coefficients of similar regressions including neighbor-pair fixed effects and
the following municipal controls: Area, Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, and Ruggedness. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 4: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for all parties, 1994-2013
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Note: The grey bars show the distribution of the estimated effects of Mediaset on parties other than
Forza Italia in all elections during the period 1994-2013. The blue vertical lines correspond to the
estimated effects on the vote share of Forza Italia.
Italia, as measured by the estimated coefficients in Table 5, with the effect
on all other parties contemporaneous to Forza Italia. Although the political
landscape changed frequently during the Second Republic, we were able to
identify 7 such parties (or coalitions) running in at least three elections: the
extreme left, the Partito Democratico, its allies in the centre-left coalition,
the centre block, Alleanza Nazionale, the Lega Nord, and the residual share
of other parties. The effect on voting for Forza Italia is generally abnormal
relative to the distribution of coefficients for the other parties, possibly
with the exception of the 2013 election (although the effect persists also in
2013 in the matching estimates, see Table 6).20
4.2 Heterogeneity
The Survey on the Structure and Behavior of Italian Households (“Indagine
sulle strutture ed i comportamenti familiari”) collects detailed information
20The 2013 elections were characterized by a profound disenchantment with the major
parties of the Second Republic (both on the right and the left of the political spectrum),
analogous to what happened at the end of the First Republic in 1992. Indeed, the new
Movimento 5 Stelle (“Five Star Movement”) emerged as the largest electoral force with
25.5% of the votes. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the political message
of Berlusconi was greeted with skepticism, possibly also by voters that had been longer
exposed to his television channels. Indeed, Forza Italia lost about 6.5 million votes
between 2008 and 2013.
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on habits and time-use for a representative sample of the Italian popula-
tion in 1983 (ISTAT, 1985). The main results concerning TV consumption
are reproduced in Table 7. Panel A of the table shows that the number of
hours spent watching TV increases considerably when moving from North-
ern to Southern Italy. This squares well with the absence of a statistically
significant effect of early Mediaset exposure in the North, a large and sta-
tistically significant effect in the South, and an intermediate effect in the
Center - see columns (1)-(3) of Table 8. By contrast, neither TV consump-
tion nor the estimated coefficient of Mediaset vary significantly with the
size of municipalities; see Panel B of Table 7 and columns (4)-(6) in Table
8, respectively.21
In order to explore additional dimensions of heterogeneity, we take ad-
vantage of individual-level data from the Italian National Election Study
(ITANES), an ongoing survey conducted immediately before and after all
national elections since 1972. Each wave covers a representative sample
of the Italian population – between 2,000 and 3,000 individuals. We fo-
cus throughout on all waves between 1994 and 2013. The survey contains
detailed information on the respondents’ (self-reported) voting choice, po-
litical participation, media consumption, and a range of individual char-
acteristics such as age, gender, education, and employment. Crucially,
the survey also reports the code of the municipality where the respondent
resides (1,878 municipalities in total), which allows us to assign to each
respondent a value for Mediaset pre-1985 signal intensity.
In columns (1) of Table 9 we pool together all individuals interviewed
during the period 1994-2013 and we regress a dummy for voting Forza
Italia on Signal, SignalFree, a range of individual controls (gender, age,
education, employment, marital status, household size), and year fixed ef-
fects. The effect of early exposure to Mediaset is positive and strongly
statistically significant, and it remains identical when we add all munici-
pality controls (area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness,
income, education) and fixed effects for the 110 Italian provinces (columns
21One potential issue with the baseline estimates in Tables 4 and 5 is that results are
driven by a few large cities in the sample. The results in Table 8 suggest that this is
not the case, as the coefficient of interest remains very stable across municipalities of
different size. Indeed, the unweighted OLS coefficient is slightly larger than the weighted
one.
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Table 7: TV consumption in 1983
hours of TV per day (distribution) heavy TV average
≤ 2 hours 3-4 hours 5-6 hours 6+ hours viewers n. hours
all sample 0.39 0.47 0.12 0.03 0.15 2.86
Panel A: by geographical area
North 0.44 0.43 0.11 0.03 0.13 2.71
Centre 0.39 0.47 0.13 0.02 0.14 2.85
South 0.32 0.52 0.13 0.03 0.16 3.06
Panel B: by size of the population in 1981
less than 500,000 0.41 0.46 0.12 0.03 0.15 2.89
less than 50,000 0.39 0.46 0.12 0.03 0.15 2.86
less than 5,000 0.41 0.44 0.12 0.03 0.15 2.84
Panel C: by gender, education, and employment condition
females 0.35 0.48 0.13 0.03 0.16 2.99
males 0.42 0.45 0.10 0.02 0.12 2.72
high school dropout 0.36 0.48 0.13 0.03 0.16 2.95
high school or college 0.49 0.42 0.08 0.02 0.09 2.48
not employed 0.28 0.51 0.17 0.04 0.21 3.27
employed 0.50 0.43 0.06 0.01 0.08 2.43
Panel D: by age of the respondent:
children (below 10) 0.27 0.51 0.19 0.03 0.22 3.30
youth (10-24) 0.33 0.51 0.14 0.03 0.16 3.06
adults (25-44) 0.45 0.45 0.09 0.02 0.10 2.61
pre-retirees (45-54) 0.45 0.43 0.10 0.02 0.12 2.66
retirees (55 or above) 0.37 0.45 0.13 0.04 0.17 2.96
Note: The table reports the results of a survey conducted by the Italian National Statistical Institute
(ISTAT) in 1983 on the habits of Italian households, which included a set of questions on media
consumption. The first four columns report the fraction of individuals in each group (rows) watching
a given number of hours of TV per day. The category of heavy TV viewers in column (5) includes
individuals watching 5 hours or more. The average number of hours in column (6) is approximated by
attributing 1 hour to individuals reporting up to 2, 3.5 hours to those reporting 3 to 4, 5.5 hours to
those reporting 5 to 6, and 7 hours to those reporting 6 or more. Source: ISTAT (1985)
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Table 8: Heterogeneity in the effect of Mediaset across geographical areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
by geographical area by population in 1981
North Center South < 500k < 50k < 5k
Signal 0.257 0.777* 1.134** 0.727*** 0.654*** 0.741***
(0.242) (0.411) (0.441) (0.219) (0.219) (0.216)
Constant 8.660*** 15.798* 22.529*** 14.972*** 29.540*** 18.959***
(2.690) (8.576) (2.357) (2.717) (2.623) (1.831)
Observations 25,400 5,550 14,124 45,044 44,346 33,135
R2 0.811 0.893 0.729 0.704 0.686 0.662
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the vote share
of Forza Italia in all elections between 1994 and 2013 across different samples of municipalities. Signal
is the simulated intensity of Mediaset’s signal in 1985. All regressions control for SignalFree, Area,
Altitude, Area2, Altitude2, Ruggedness, Electorate, Log income per capita, Education, and fixed effects
for electoral districts, local labor markets, and years. Observations are weighted by municipality pop-
ulation in 1981. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9: Heterogeneity in the effect of Mediaset across different groups of
individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
total sample
gender education employed
female male low high no yes
Signal 0.026*** 0.029** 0.028** 0.031** 0.022 0.039** 0.019 0.037** 0.016
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 10,600 10,489 10,489 5,107 5,382 4,980 5,509 5,292 5,197
municipality controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
province FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.066 0.069 0.081 0.094 0.075 0.107 0.075 0.090 0.085
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the probability of
voting Forza Italia for individuals interviewed by the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) between
1994 and 2013. Signal is the simulated intensity of Mediaset’s signal in 1985. All regressions control
for Signal free and for the following individual characteristics: Education, Gender, Age, Employment
status, Marital status, and Number of family members. The specifications on columns (2) to (9) control
also for municipality characteristics (Education, Log income per capita, Area Area2, Altitude, Altitude2,
and Ruggedness) and columns (3) to (9) add province fixed effects. The specifications in columns (4)
to (9) consider different sub-samples indicated on top of each column. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2 and 3 of the table, respectively); standard errors are clustered at the
municipality-level.22 According to this estimate, a one standard deviation
increase in pre-1985 signal intensity is associated with an increase in the
probability of voting for Forza Italia of almost 3 percentage points, a mag-
nitude comparable to that estimated across municipalities.
Distinguishing between different groups of individuals, the effect is
larger for females, the less educated and individuals out of employment
(i.e., inactive or unemployed), whereas it is not significantly different from
zero for males, more educated and employed individuals; see columns (4) to
(9) of Table 9. This heterogeneity in the effect of Mediaset lines up nicely
with differences in TV consumption by gender, education, and employment
status, shown in the Panel C of Table 7.23
Finally, the age profile of TV consumption and Mediaset influence is
also very similar. Panel D of Table 7 reports the number of hours of
TV watched by children (below 10 years of age), youth (10-24), adults
(24-44), pre-retired (45-54) , and retirees (55 or older).24 Children and
retirees comprise a larger fraction of heavy TV users, probably because
they spend a higher fraction of time at home, so it is likely they were more
exposed to Mediaset in the early 1980s. Indeed, we find that the later voting
behavior of individuals who were in these two age categories in 1985 is
more influenced by early exposure to Mediaset, while there is no significant
effect on the other age cohorts. As a consequence, the magnitude of the
Mediaset effect exhibits a similar U-shaped age profile as TV consumption
- see Figure 5.
Summarizing, TV consumption and the magnitude of the Mediaset ef-
fect exhibit similar gradients both across geographical areas and individual
groups.
22We cannot include the same set of fixed effects used in municipal regressions since
many electoral districts and labor markets include only one or a few respondents, yet
it is reassuring that fixed effects at the provincial level – the administrative level just
above municipalities – do not affect the coefficient of interest.
23Unfortunately, the aggregate data available from (ISTAT, 1985) do not allow for
disentangling the separate effect of each individual characteristic on TV consumption.
For instance, it could be that TV consumption depends mainly on employment condi-
tion, and male and educated individuals watch fewer hours of TV only because they
have a higher probability of being employed.
24During the 1980s the retirement age was between 55 and 60 years of age for most
categories of workers.
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Figure 5: TV consumption and effect of early exposure to Mediaset by
cohorts
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Note: The left graph shows the fraction of heavy TV viewers and the average number of hours of TV
per day by age group (from Table 7). The right graph shows OLS estimates and confidence intervals
of the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the probability of voting Forza Italia for the same age
groups. The OLS specification is the same as in columns (3) to (9) of Table 9.
4.3 Potential explanations and additional results
Based on the findings discussed above one may wonder how the effect of
Mediaset could persist for so long, given that the differential exposure to
the network pre-1985 only lasted a few years.
The relative magnitude of the effect on different age cohorts, depicted
in Figure 5, provides some important insights in this respect. The average
effect of Mediaset on the probability of voting Forza Italia across all indi-
viduals (2.8 percentage points) is driven by a much larger and very similar
effect on younger and older cohorts (7.8 and 9.8 percentage points, respec-
tively). The former group comprises individuals that in 1985 were younger
than 10, whereas the latter comprises individuals that in 1985 were older
than 55. One possible explanation for the persistence of the effect over
two decades is that younger cohorts joining the voting population in 1994
or later progressively replaced the older ones who were gradually exiting -
leaving the overall share of voters affected by Mediaset largely unaffected.
To assess the plausibility of this hypothesis, we exploit additional infor-
mation on the age composition of Italian voters between 1994 and 2006,
available from the Istituto Cattaneo.25 Based on these data, and on the
25The Istituto Cattaneo is an independent organization conducting research on elec-
toral participation and political trends in Italy. During the period 1994-2006 it collected
individual-level data – age, gender, and main occupation – on a representative sample of
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Table 10: Age distribution of voters and implied effect of Mediaset in each
election
1994 1996 2001 2006
share of voters 55 or older in 1985 (born on or before 1930) 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.09
share of voters below 10 in 1985 (born after 1975) 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.14
share of voters below 10 or 55+ in 1985 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.23
implied effect of Mediaset on voting for Forza Italia 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.019
Note: The implied effect of Mediaset on voting for Forza Italia (last row of the table) is computed
by multiplying the share of younger and older voters (first two rows of the table) by the coefficients
estimated for such age groups (reported in the right graph of Figure 5).
specific effects estimated for the two age-groups of interests, in Table 10 we
compute the implied effect of Mediaset in each election between 1994 and
2006. Taken together, the two age-groups account for about 20 percent of
total voters in 1994; this share remains very stable in subsequent elections
as the the increase in the number of voters that were younger than 10 in
1985 almost exactly compensates for the reduction in the number of voters
that were older than 55 in 1985.
Although this back-of-the-envelope calculation does not fully explain
the extreme persistence of the Mediaset effect, it shows that this is largely
consistent with the fact that the youngest and oldest cohorts who spent
more time watching TV in 1985 were more exposed to and influenced by
Mediaset content.
Another relevant question is through what mechanisms pre-1985 expo-
sure to Mediaset may have affected the political preferences of both young
and old viewers, especially since no news or informational programs were
available on Mediaset channels at that time.
One possibility is that early Mediaset viewers developed a form of at-
tachment to the network that made them more likely to watch any Medi-
aset program, including newscasts once these were introduced on Mediaset.
Since, after Berlusconi entered politics, news coverage on Mediaset channels
has been traditionally biased in favor of his party, this could explain the
higher propensity of early Mediaset viewers to vote for Forza Italia. To test
this hypothesis we exploit the fact that the ITANES surveys conducted be-
Italian voters, as reported on the identity documents presented to election officials. The
age distribution in each of these elections is plotted in Figure A5 of the Web Appendix.
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Figure 6: Early exposure to Mediaset, news consumption, and interest in
politics
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Note: The graphs show the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the probability of watching news on
the same network (left graph) and being interested in politics (right graphs) for ITANES respondents
interviewed during the period 1994-2013, by age group. The age-specific coefficients are estimated by
OLS using the same as in columns (3) to (9) of Table 9.
tween 1994 and 2013 ask respondents to report their favorite news channel.
Based on this information, we construct a dummy variable for watching
news on Mediaset and regress it on Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 (plus
province fixed effects and municipal controls) separately for the different
age groups. The results are reported in the left panel of Figure 6. While
for the older cohorts earlier exposure to Mediaset is indeed associated with
a higher probability of watching news on Mediaset in and after 1994, this
is not the case for any of the other age groups, including the youngest.
An alternative explanation, put forth by Putnam (2000) in his work on
the decline of social capital in the U.S., is that exposure to TV - and specifi-
cally to light entertainment content - negatively affects individuals’ propen-
sity to get interested and participate in politics, especially for younger gen-
erations. We explore this hypothesis using data from the ITANES surveys
on respondents’ self-reported interest in politics. As before, we estimate
our baseline regression separately for each age group and plot the coeffi-
cients. The results, depicted in the right hand panel of Figure 6, show that
individuals exposed to Mediaset at an age of 10 or less display significantly
lower levels of interest in politics as adults - this is not the case for any
other age group. In the context of Italy, less politically engaged and in-
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formed individuals were arguably more receptive to Berlusconi’s populist
rhetoric and aggressive campaign style, and less sympathetic to traditional
left-wing parties which relied heavily on the activism of a large number of
party members. Indeed, data from the ITANES surveys confirm that Forza
Italia voters are generally less interested in politics than other voters, and
less likely to engage in any political activity, from participating in rallies
to signing of petitions (see Table A3 of the Web Appendix).
Taken together, our findings suggest that exposure to entertainment
TV had a long-lasting effect on the political preferences of both younger
and older generations, although through different mechanisms. While for
young viewers early exposure to entertainment content had a direct impact
on political attitudes, for old viewers this effect was indirect, mediated by
increased attachment to the network and later exposure to partisan news
bias.
We cannot of course exclude that the effect of early exposure to Me-
diaset may operate through other channels as well. For instance, early
Mediaset viewers may have been more likely to know who Berlusconi was
when he first ran for office in 1994; yet, this could have hardly been a factor
in subsequent elections since, after his 1994 victory, Berlusconi became one
of the country’s best known public figures. A related possibility is that
early Mediaset viewers developed a sense of gratitude toward Berlusconi
for the unprecedented entertainment opportunities offered by his channels,
and were hence more likely to support any initiative he would embark upon.
As an indirect test of this hypothesis we examine whether early Mediaset
viewers were also more likely to support Berlusconi’s soccer team A.C. Mi-
lan, presumably the best known non-political venture commonly associated
with his name. Our results, available upon request, provide no support for
this hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
Over the past decade political economists have been increasingly interested
in understanding to what extent mass media in general, and television in
particular, can affect viewers’ political attitudes and, ultimately, their vot-
ing decisions. This literature has focused on the impact of news coverage,
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but has overlooked the possibility that content other than news - which
accounts for most of TV airtime - may also affect political preferences in
other, possibly subtler ways. Furthermore, previous studies have focused
on how exposure to TV influences voting in the short-run, i.e. in one elec-
tion, but evidence on whether this effect is long-lasting or short-lived is
scant.
This research attempts to fill these gaps by investigating the politi-
cal consequences of the introduction of commercial television in Italy over
the past three decades. Our analysis documents that areas that were ex-
posed to Berlusconi’s commercial TV network, Mediaset, in the early 1980s
displayed higher electoral support for Berlusconi’s party once he entered
politics, in 1994. This effect is large, significant, and robust to different em-
pirical strategies and it persists for five elections and almost two decades.
Crucially, the documented effect must relate, directly or indirectly, to the
exposure of early Mediaset viewers to light entertainment content which
dominated Mediaset channels in the 1980s when news and informational
programs were virtually absent.
Using individual survey data we also document that the effect of Me-
diaset is particularly pronounced for older and especially younger voters,
who tended to spend more time watching TV. Indeed, the particular age
distribution of the individuals that were most influenced by Mediaset can
go a long way in explaining the persistence of the effect at the aggregate
level, since, over time, younger viewers gradually replaced older ones in the
voting population. Finally, we find evidence that early exposure to Medi-
aset influenced young and old viewers in different ways. Older voters be-
came attached to the network and were more likely to watch pro-Berlusconi
slanted news when these were introduced. In contrast, individuals exposed
to Mediaset at a very young age became less interested in politics as adults,
and, as such, potentially more receptive to Berlusconi’s powerful populist
rhetoric.
Our study is the first to rigorously document that exposure to entertain-
ment content on TV can have a significant influence on viewers’ political
preferences, and that the impact of TV on voting can be very long-lasting.
Our findings also indicate that particular categories of individuals, espe-
cially the very young, may be especially vulnerable to the influence of
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TV, and that such influence may operate through different and rather age-
specific mechanisms.
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Web Appendix – Not for publication
Figure A1: Vote share of the main political coalitions during the Italian
Second Republic (19994-2013)
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Table A1: Differences in electoral results during the period 1976-1992 be-
tween neighboring municipalities exposed and not exposed to Mediaset in
1985
Means comparison FEs and topography
All SF < 1 SF < 0.5 All SF < 1 SF < 0.5
Italian Communist Party, 1976 -0.291 -0.044 -0.273 -0.370 -0.193 -0.417
(0.619) (0.919) (1.080) (0.294) (0.446) (0.599)
Pentapartito, 1976 -0.105 -0.147 0.099 0.059 -0.030 0.280
(0.586) (0.880) (1.056) (0.297) (0.441) (0.575)
Other parties, 1976 0.389 0.172 0.145 0.307** 0.164 0.101
(0.330) (0.300) (0.405) (0.143) (0.167) (0.201)
Italian Communist Party, 1979 -0.337 -0.112 -0.265 -0.318 -0.214 -0.375
(0.620) (0.902) (1.050) (0.276) (0.410) (0.556)
Pentapartito, 1979 -0.054 0.097 0.559 0.049 0.210 0.748
(0.581) (0.882) (1.057) (0.289) (0.442) (0.578)
Other parties, 1979 0.368 0.050 -0.080 0.254** 0.047 -0.133
(0.236) (0.277) (0.372) (0.127) (0.176) (0.199)
Italian Communist Party, 1983 -0.417 -0.080 -0.350 -0.424 -0.180 -0.335
(0.622) (0.901) (1.050) (0.277) (0.427) (0.564)
Pentapartito, 1983 -0.015 0.205 0.840 0.130 0.373 1.006*
(0.595) (0.857) (1.027) (0.287) (0.452) (0.561)
Other parties, 1983 0.521** 0.067 -0.153 0.394*** 0.043 -0.240
(0.261) (0.355) (0.430) (0.135) (0.205) (0.229)
Italian Communist Party, 1987 -0.743 -0.257 -0.816 -0.680*** -0.327 -0.767
(0.593) (0.864) (1.000) (0.264) (0.404) (0.546)
Pentapartito, 1987 0.103 0.205 0.823 0.193 0.280 0.841
(0.584) (0.880) (1.052) (0.270) (0.416) (0.538)
Other parties, 1987 0.577* 0.124 0.126 0.446*** 0.109 0.090
(0.302) (0.360) (0.466) (0.136) (0.192) (0.234)
Italian Communist Party, 1992 -0.532 -0.279 -0.331 -0.479** -0.229 -0.184
(0.459) (0.620) (0.697) (0.200) (0.342) (0.435)
Pentapartito, 1992 0.042 0.411 0.779 0.185 0.484 0.752
(0.678) (1.030) (1.258) (0.260) (0.390) (0.515)
Other parties, 1992 0.411 -0.076 -0.199 0.231 -0.219 -0.296
(0.609) (0.927) (1.167) (0.177) (0.275) (0.370)
Note: The table reports differences in electoral results during the period between neighboring munic-
ipalities with Signal above and below zero (i.e., that could and could not receive Mediaset channels
in 1985). The first column reports the coefficients of a regression of the vote share of each party in a
given election on a dummy for Signal greater than zero across the total sample of neighbor-pairs. The
second and third columns report analogous coefficients estimated on the sub-sample of neighbor-pairs
with difference in SignalFree smaller than 1 dB and 0.5 dB, respectively. The last three columns report
the estimated coefficients of similar regressions including neighbor-pair fixed effects and the following
municipal controls: Area, Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, and Ruggedness. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A2
Figure A2: Distribution of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985
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Note: The figure reports the distribution of signal intensity in 1985 across Italian municipalities. The
dashed red lines indicate the top and bottom 2.5% of the distribution.
Table A2: Differences in the municipality characteristics between neigh-
boring municipalities exposed and not exposed to Mediaset in 1985
Means comparison FEs and topography
All SF < 1 SF < 0.5 All SF < 1 SF < 0.5
Population, thousands (1981) 6.940** -0.175 -0.039 3.167 -0.039 -0.621
(2.766) (1.120) (1.083) (1.978) (0.728) (0.595)
Population per sq. Km (1981) 78.147*** 59.856 58.217 66.027*** 44.586** 45.107
(27.376) (56.187) (88.589) (13.504) (21.768) (32.178)
Population growth, 1981-2001 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.005 0.003 0.017
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Activity rate, percentage (1991) 0.177 0.228 0.557 0.096 0.179 0.523**
(0.221) (0.377) (0.501) (0.103) (0.169) (0.241)
Employment rate, percentage (1991) 0.034 0.002 0.256 -0.053 -0.078 0.165
(0.371) (0.575) (0.735) (0.104) (0.162) (0.234)
Unemployment rate, percentage (1991) -0.083 -0.026 -0.075 -0.056 0.073 0.103
(0.256) (0.329) (0.425) (0.116) (0.177) (0.236)
log income per capita, euros (1985) 0.022 -0.001 0.004 0.016*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Education, % higher education (1981) 0.588*** -0.095 -0.145 0.403*** -0.131 -0.254
(0.213) (0.246) (0.293) (0.120) (0.168) (0.208)
Firms per capita (1981) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001* -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Voluntarily association X 100 pop. (1981) 0.001 -0.006 -0.016 0.002 -0.008 -0.022*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012)
Voluntarily association X 100 firms (1981) -0.003 -0.216 -0.406 0.027 -0.249 -0.504**
(0.122) (0.217) (0.272) (0.093) (0.161) (0.226)
Note: The table reports the differences between neighboring municipalities with Signal above and below
zero (i.e., that could and could not receive Mediaset channels in 1985). The first column reports the
coefficients of a regression of each row variable on a dummy for Signal greater than zero across the total
sample of neighbor-pairs. The second and third columns report analogous coefficients estimated on the
sub-sample of neighbor-pairs with difference in SignalFree smaller than 1 dB and 0.5 dB, respectively.
The last three columns report the estimated coefficients of similar regressions including neighbor-pair
fixed effects and the following municipal controls: Area, Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, and Ruggedness.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A3: Example of a technical report sheet for one of the Mediaset
transmitters active in 1985
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Figure A4: Electoral districts and local labor markets in the region of
Abruzzo
Table A3: Profile of Forza Italia voters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
interested in politics -0.061***
(0.013)
attended political debates -0.019
(0.013)
took part in a rally -0.122***
(0.019)
signed a petition -0.035*
(0.018)
sum of political actions -0.034***
(0.009)
Constant 0.234*** 0.216*** 0.242*** 0.211*** 0.435*** 0.244***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.060) (0.062) (0.047)
Observations 6,162 6,163 8,165 4,104 6,356 8,168
R2 0.224 0.225 0.267 0.206 0.305 0.269
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of a dummy equal to 1 for ITANES respondents reporting to
vote for Forza Italia on different measures of civic and political engagement. All regressions control for
municipality and year fixed effects, and for the following individual-level controls: Education, Gender,
Age, Employment status, Marital status, and Number of family members. Standard errors clustered at
the municipal level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A5: Age distribution of voters at the national elections, 1994-2006
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